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The election will be ‘a popularity contest with no significance’ wrote Henry Kissinger one year 
after the Carnation Revolution that had put an end to 48 years of right wing dictatorship. In April 
1975 the Portuguese were to elect the representatives for a constitutional convention, but the 
head of the US foreign policy was convinced that the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das 
Forças Armadas-MFA), in alliance with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), would not cede 
its newly conquered power to civilian politicians1. John Vincent-Smith, a British scholar that 
reported from Lisbon, also trivialized the ballot. Against the backdrop of the social and political 
turmoil of previous months – rife with strikes, demonstrations and instability– Vincent-Smith 
wished the Portuguese a ‘long, hot and quiet summer’ that would allow for economic 
reconstruction2. The middle months of 1975 are indeed remembered as the ‘hot summer’, but 
not for it being warm and drowsy, but because  political polarisation reached boiling point, 
spilling over into street politics and violence, leading Portugal to the edge of civil war.  
Classic studies about transitions to democracy argue that a high level of mobilisation may 
jeopardise the prospects of democratisation3. More recent scholarship, however, has stressed 
that the mobilisation of civil society may have a positive role in creating opportunities for reform, 
making democratic gains irreversible and increasing the bargaining resources of pro-democracy 
elites4. This text offers a framework for understanding the role that mass politics played in the 
Portuguese case.  
The Portuguese transition defies formal models that pit dictatorial elites against democratic 
reformers. After the toppling of the dictatorship a radical coalition took power and electoral 
democracy had thus to triumph over both right-wing dictatorship and socialist revolution5. In 
the summer of 1975 a peculiar form of military-led popular democracy became a possibility, 
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triggering the mobilisation of the Catholic Church, moderate political parties and far-right 
activists against what they feared was a communist takeover. They succeeded in stabilising 
electoral democracy in Portugal, but their success cannot be understood without taking into 
account popular participation in mass meetings, demonstrations and violent riots. 
The proliferation of memoirs and the opening of state archives have favoured interpretations 
that underline the role played in the anti-communist resistance by leaders, parties, military 
officers, international organisations and secret services. These perspectives miss the key 
participation of hundreds of thousands of citizens, as they tend to take mass response for 
granted, without recognising the strategic autonomy of popular mobilisation and its ability to 
shape the choice of the elites6. Catholic bishops and political parties called for, facilitated and 
oriented popular mobilisation, while international organisations provided resources and 
diplomatic support which strengthened moderate parties and trade unions7. Nonetheless, the 
key ingredient of the triumph of electoral democracy was the participation itself of hundreds of 
thousands of anonymous citizens. First, they voted, and then, during the hot summer of 1975, 
they took part in rallies, demonstrations and violent rioting, upholding the value of their vote 
and making the electoral results count.  
Popular mobilisation caught the eye of political scientists that poured into Portugal after the 
carnation revolution, but they paid scarce attention to the anti-communist mobilisation of 1975. 
In addition, most accounts focused on events taking place in Lisbon, Porto, the industrial city of 
Setúbal and the large estates of the south occupied by landless peasants, disregarding the rural 
and conservative regions of central and northern Portugal. What caught most scholar’s eye was 
the grassroots activism of landless peasants, slum dwellers and workers, teeming with examples 
of direct action and self-management throughout 1974 and 1975. Sharing the view of the 
Portuguese far left, which worked towards the articulation of grassroots struggles into a 
“popular power” movement for radically democratic socialism, many analysts suggested that 
these popular movements held the promise of a more participatory democracy8. The 25 
November 1975 coup re-equilibrated the political situation and social struggles receded, but 
recent studies suggest that the revolution strengthened civil society, leaving a positive legacy in 
the quality of Portuguese democracy9. These analysis focus on the democratic content of social 
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struggles and associational life, but leave aside the agency and legacy of those citizens who, by 
mobilising against the MFA and communism made electoral democracy triumph10. 
Recently, Pedro Ramos Pinto has challenged the ´popular power’ narrative, stressing the fact 
that, at least in Lisbon, the rank and file of many popular organisations did not follow their 
leadership when it sided with the radical wing of the military, choosing electoral democracy 
instead11. This article offers a new account of the significance and political impact of the anti-
communist rallies, demonstrations and riots during 1975. It also offers a geographically balanced 
account of popular protest and provides an interpretation of the mechanisms by which anti-
communist mobilisation empowered the moderate leaders and reversed the balance of power 
within the military, playing a crucial role in the triumph of electoral democracy12. 
 
Observers of revolutions often refer to the acceleration of time. In the aftermath of the 25 April 
1974 revolution, the hitherto all-powerful political police was criminalised, the higher ranks of 
the military were purged and all the heads of regional governments and local councils replaced. 
Then, in less than two years Portugal had two presidents of the Republic, three prime ministers 
and six provisional governments. The country also witnessed three coup d’état attempts, the 
nationalisation of all Portuguese banks and the greater part of the big industry, the launching of 
the land reform in favour of landless peasants and, to end a list that is far from exhaustive, the 
decolonisation of the African empire. The street mobilisation of varied social and political actors 
had a say in all of these events13. Thousands of Portuguese took the streets in support of 
disparate political and economic goals, overflowing the political space. Newspapers were filled 
with pictures of crowds gathering, marching or rioting. A revolutionary situation had emerged 
in which the reference points that could coordinate expectations and frame experience could 
quickly shift, depending on the stream of actions and events. 
In the wake of the coup, the political preferences of the Portuguese were unknown and open to 
redefinition. ‘With no previous elections’, the socialist Mário Soares recalled, ‘the newly 
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legalised political parties had to test their strength by taking part in the social struggles’14. Both 
free speech and the right to organise political parties were new possibilities. A wave of 
enthusiastic political learning and experimentation ensued. Mobilisation partook in both the 
dismantling of the ‘fascist’ regime and the struggle for better wages and living conditions. 
Throughout May and June 1974 most ‘fascist’ local and regional authorities were removed from 
office. In shop floors, workers organised and held owners and managers accountable for having 
based their negotiating power on the repressive legislation that prohibited strikes and 
independent unions. While society was in turmoil, the press reported the activity of 48 political 
parties, the more salient of which –  PS (Partido Socialista), PCP (Partido Comunista Português), 
MDP (Movimento Democrático Português) and PPD (Partido Popular Democrático) –  
participated in the provisional government, side by side with the MFA.  
 
Popular mobilisation did not conceal the fact that it was the military who had carried out the 
revolution. MFA and non-MFA officers would be key political players during the two 
revolutionary years, but they were actors-in-progress, undergoing an identity redefinition15. At 
the outset the MFA was a coalition of about 400 middle-rank officers, bound by the desire to 
put an end to the colonial war. The unintended hero-like reception they got from the civilian 
population, in turn, offered them a new identity and a source of legitimation at odds with 
hierarchy and discipline.  
The institutional breakdown of the Portuguese state was formally disguised after the coup by 
the offer of key positions to the only two army generals not compulsorily retired: Spínola was 
appointed President of the Republic and Costa Gomes became the head of the armed forces16. 
Nevertheless, they never became the centre of power. The MFA officers remained vigilant, to 
prevent counterrevolutionary moves and deviations from the spirit of their program, and kept 
the more powerful units under their command. In many units, MFA captains overruled the 
nominal command of the regimental colonels.  
During the week that lapsed between the 25 of April and the May Day celebrations, the MFA 
and ‘the people’ signed a ‘symbolic contract’ all over Portugal17. ‘Huge demonstration 
supporting the liberating forces’ was the most repeated headline in the regional newspapers. In 
the Northern town of Chaves ‘the people made use of their freedom. Thousands gathered 
holding posters and flags, went to the municipal cemetery, and afterwards headed to Battalion 
number 10, where they complimented the commander, expressing the People's admiration and 
thankfulness’18. Similar homages to the local military took place all over the country. In every 
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district capital the regimental officers, especially if they belonged to the MFA, became a constant 
presence in social and political life, overseeing the substitution of local authority officials. The 
press also depicted the massive May Day demonstrations as a 'civic lesson’; a celebratory taking 
of the streets in which the common people, by their peaceful demeanour, showed that they 
were ready for democracy19. 
Interaction with the popular movements also spurred the transformation of the military. Police 
forces were sidelined from social conflict because of their association with 'fascist repression', 
so the military stepped in. In any social conflict, while the police would be received with hostility, 
any army detachment was cheered by the protestors. Fraternisation ensued.  ‘We were sent to 
liberate an occupied factory’, a junior officer recalls, ‘but when we arrived and assessed the 
situation, we discovered that the workers were right’20. The usual trappings of military discipline 
began to fade and, as months went by and a new revolutionary identity developed, more and 
more officers grew conspicuous beards and wore unbuttoned uniforms, thus displaying their 
revolutionary commitment. This transformation did not move at the same pace in all military 
units. Lisbon’s Military Police, which had the most contact with the popular movements, and the 
units that had the barracks in working class neighbourhoods or the highly symbolic rural south, 
became more porous to the surrounding political ambience. Units barracked in the northern 
conservative countryside, on the other hand, had fewer occasions to intervene in social conflicts. 
Last but not least, tacit agreements were reached within the units: some devoted officers 
volunteered to deal with social conflict and were the visible face of the army, while the rest 
remained aloof and uncommitted21.  
 
Squares all over Portugal became forums of political discussion. The dictatorship’s elite was 
pushed aside from public life, which in turn witnessed the hegemony of the vocabulary, the 
symbols and the organisations of the left and the far left22. President Spínola wanted to avoid 
handing the African colonies to the guerrilla movements and feared both the disorganisation of 
the army and the growing communist influence. Neither the MFA nor the government followed 
his lead, and in the meantime a radical platform was coalescing around the Prime Minister, 
Colonel Vasco Gonçalves. After a tour visiting military units and addressing large crowds in public 
squares, Spínola’s supporters called for a large-scale demonstration in Lisbon on 28 September 
1974. It would give voice, they claimed, to the 'silent majority'23. 
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Order-loving Portuguese were called on to rally in Lisbon from all over the country. This move 
worried left-wing groups. Spínola explored the possibility of re-illegalizing the PCP and rumours 
spread that he would use the meeting as a platform for a coup d’état24. Posters all over Lisbon 
depicted the ‘silent majority’ demonstration as a fascist plot. Trade unionists and political 
activists barricaded the roads to Lisbon. Civilian pickets stopped cars suspected of being headed 
to Lisbon, searched for weapons and forced many to return home. Spínola called on the army 
to clear the roads, but the MFA forces sided with ‘the people’ and overwhelmed the few among 
the police who followed the president’s orders25. The general was forced to resign; his 
supporters were removed from office and General Costa Gomes, closer to the left, became the 
new President of the Republic26. 
The next key confrontation came in January 1975, when the government discussed a decree 
mandating a unitary federation of trade unions. The communists cheered ‘the unity of the 
working class’, but the socialists feared that it would compromise freedom of association. For 
the first time, the PS openly opposed a decision by the provisional government – of which they 
were also part. The leading trade unions, by now mostly aligned with the communists, took the 
streets of Lisbon in a huge demonstration to display ‘the great and calm expression of the 
popular will’, supporting the decree27.  
The socialists replied with public meetings in support of 'freedom of association'. To mark the 
high point of the campaign, they ventured to call for a rally in Lisbon's sports pavilion, one of the 
largest venues in the capital. Mário Soares thought this was risky and, fearing that his party 
would be unable to fill the house, opposed the choice of venue. To his amazement, more than 
10,000 citizens turned up, packing the pavilion and leaving a sizeable crowd outside, unable to 
enter the premises. 'We are a great party of the working masses', the socialists were now in a 
position to claim28. The Minister for Work was unimpressed by the socialist´s display and 
informed that the demonstrations in favour of the decree had been more widely attended. This 
showdown was a ‘consultation of the working classes’, and according to Prime Minister Colonel 
Vasco Gonçalves, ‘[…] not approving the law would be a breach in the alliance between the 
people and the MFA'29. The socialists lost the day, but they had discovered their ability to rally 
mass support. 
In April 1974 the MFA had promised elections in the space of a year, but by the end of January 
1975 the political future of Portugal was still hanging in the balance. The radicals were increasing 
their resources, the date of the poll had not been announced yet and the communists made 
their doubts regarding the vote public. Álvaro Cunhal, PCP´s leader, explained that after more 
                                                          
24 D.F. do Amaral,  O Antigo Regime e a Revolução (Lisbon 1995). 
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27 Diário de Lisboa (17 January 1975), 1. 
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than 40 years of dictatorship many citizens were not ready for an informed and free choice. At 
the same time, while the barring of the dictatorship´s elite from taking part in the election was 
uncontested, the red line separating ‘fascists’ from the new conservative parties was not easy 
to draw. That same month, in Porto, a handful of ‘antifascist’ protesters violently attacked the 
founding convention of the most prominent centre-right party, the CDS (Centro Democrático e 
Social). The passivity of the police and the military allowed the demonstrators to disrupt the 
meeting, making several conservative European leaders flee in panic. The right-wing 
international press began to talk about the risks of an imminent communist takeover30.  
As the political situation evolved, the socialists began to use their recently discovered ability to 
mobilise crowds to push for the early scheduling of the election. The PS supported the MFA, but 
urged the military to be true to their initial promise of handing the power over to civilians. The 
next big show of force came on 14 February, when the PS raised the stakes and succeeded in 
packing Lisbon's bullfighting ring –a feat that hitherto only the PCP had achieved. The firmness 
of its position and its repeated ability to rally the support of committed masses highlighted the 
pivotal role the PS could play. As this preponderance surfaced, the church hierarchy chose the 
PS as its main political interlocutor, an ally within the left camp that could represent its interests, 
and the same applies to Frank Carlucci, recently named US ambassador to Lisbon31. 
As the radicalisation of the MFA began to frighten some, on 11 March 1975 the conservative 
military attempted a new coup, but it was foiled. Large-scale demonstrations celebrated the 
MFA's victory, the radicals increased their share in the provisional government and the 
nationalisation of the banking industry was decreed. As banks owned most of the big industry 
and national newspapers, the state now controlled enormous chunks of the economy and most 
of the media. The failed coup encouraged voices within the MFA to propose the postponement 
of the ballot, but a conciliatory measure won the day: the MFA would guarantee the poll, but 
the parties, in turn, were asked to sign an agreement guaranteeing the tutelary role of the 
military: a new MFA-appointed Council of the Revolution would steer the political process, and 
the parties waived their claim to a share of power according to the vote – deputies were elected 
for drafting a constitution – and, finally, all agreed that the constitution would enshrine the goal 
of building socialism. 
Contrary to Kissinger, quoted in the introduction, Portuguese citizens did not discount the 
meaning of the election. A record-high 91 per cent of the electorate turned out. In addition, the 
voters gave a clear majority to the PS, 37.8 per cent, and also voted for other parties that 
supported a European-style pluralistic democracy: PPD came second with 26.4 per cent of the 
vote, and the ‘Christian’ CDS came fourth with 7.6 per cent. Nonetheless, the American secretary 
of state was not totally wrong in his assumptions: while the communists and other radical parties 
close to the MFA did not add to more than 20 per cent of the vote, Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, 
head of the radical faction of the MFA, clung to power. 
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The regional distribution of the vote followed the pattern of the agrarian structures, which 
divides the more populous smallholder North, which voted for the centre-right (PPD and CDS), 
and the rural proletarian South, that opted for the radical left (PCP and its allies). In urban 
settings the PS got the majority of the votes, despite the PCP fairing very well in most of the 
industrial districts around Lisbon and Porto. The regional distribution of political preferences 
would underpin subsequent dynamics of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation (Map 1).  
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Map 1. Regional distribution of results in 1975 elections. 
 
 
 
Source: SICP, Portugal, um guia para o processo, SLEMES, (Lisbon, 1976) 
 
The pre-election MFA-Political Parties Agreement circumscribed the powers of the elected 
constituent assembly, but the more far reaching implications of the results could not be easily 
discarded. Framing the meaning of the political moment became a central issue. The victory of 
the socialists had to be underplayed for the MFA radicals to consolidate their positions. ‘The 
main political force did not take part in the election’ communist leader Álvaro Cunhal argued, 
‘The MFA itself would have won, had it gone to the polls’32. The radical entourage of the MFA 
underlined that ‘the voters had supported socialism, but a socialist program can only be carried 
out by a revolutionary government’. In addition, would not socialist voters follow the true 
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socialist MFA, rather than the dubious Mário Soares, if they had the choice?33. The regional 
pattern of the vote (Map 1) also offered some opportunities for interpretation. As the MFA head 
of propaganda explained, ‘the vote of the illiterate and church-controlled peasants of the North 
does not have the same value as the class conscious vote of the workers'34. The regional catholic 
press, in turn, reacted against those who diminished the value of the Northerner’s vote or called 
them ’fascists and reactionaries’, defending their right to have their own political preferences. 
In May, the gathering of thousands of pilgrims in the Virgin of Fatima sanctuary revealed the 
Catholic Church’s ability to mobilise the population35. Meanwhile, in some northern localities 
where the PPD had won, demonstrations were held against communists and fellow travellers, 
deemed to have ´taken by assault´ the local councils after the revolution. ´Let the People rule´, 
thousands claimed in Montalegre’s town council36.  
Vasco Gonçalves and the MFA radicals clung to power. According to them, and to modernisation 
theory, for an underdeveloped country like Portugal, a western style political democracy was 
not a viable possibility. The only two real options were either the revolutionary transformation 
of the country or a fascist reaction, Pinochet-style37. ‘Portugal will not be the Chile of Europe!’ 
became a preferred slogan in radical manifestos, posters and demonstrations. Nonetheless, 
within the MFA things seemed increasingly out of joint. The movement broadly agreed over 
decolonisation, strong intervention in the economy and resistance to right wing coup attempts, 
but an alignment with the Communist Party and the marginalisation of the most voted parties 
divided them. Four groups began to emerge within the MFA. In addition to the radical supporters 
of Vasco Gonçalves, an independent socialist group coalesced around Melo Antunes, while the 
charismatic Otelo de Carvalho, head of Lisbon's military division, favoured a far-left 'popular 
power' alternative that mistrusted the PCP and ‘state socialism’. Finally, a less openly 
programmatic group, 'the operationals’, was more preoccupied with maintaining the internal 
cohesion of the armed forces, a rather difficult task at the time38.  
The MFA assembly became the hub of political struggles. The different groups still had a very 
fluid composition and the voting patterns reflect a general wish to achieve consensus and 
maintain the movement’s unity, and the absence of a substantial majority ideologically 
committed to the alternative positions. This led to pronounced shifts in the resolutions made by 
the assemblies in a matter of weeks. At the same time, all the different positions within the MFA 
were courted by the civilian parties and social organisations. The courting was made in the press 
through political declarations, but also by means of rallies and demonstrations expressing 
rejection or support.  
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On 19 June the MFA assembly voted for a moderate Political action plan (Plano de acção política) 
that recognised the centrality of the political parties. The PS, welcoming it, organised street 
demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto. But the radicals, in the words of Captain Duran Clemente, 
'felt that they were still endorsed by the momentum of the revolution' and thus laboured for an 
alternative. Three weeks later, on 8 July, the radicals joined forces with the proponents of 
popular power and succeeded in making the assembly approve a very different blueprint for the 
future, the People-MFA Alliance39. This program marginalised the constituent assembly ‘as we 
did not want to be trapped by parliamentary democracy and institutions’ and called for the 
direct leadership of the MFA, in close connection with the workings of popular organisations 
and local assemblies40. The approval was celebrated by big demonstrations organised by the 
PCP, some popular organisations and the far left. 
The People-MFA Alliance document implied a break with electoral democracy. At the same time, 
the catholic radio (Rádio Renascença) and a socialist-leaning newspaper (República) had been 
taken over by their radical workers. These threats to electoral legitimacy and to the freedom of 
the press redefined the political moment. The PS withdrew from the provisional government, 
accusing Vasco Gonçalves of foreshadowing a new dictatorship, and the PPD followed suit. They 
called on their supporters to take the streets. 
‘Portugal belongs to the people, not to Moscow’ chanted the crowds in anti-government 
demonstrations41. The victors in the elections were now in the opposition camp and they put 
forward their own interpretation of the situation. According to them, the true program of the 
MFA had been perverted, as it promised to hand power over to civilian politicians. In addition, 
there was only one way of understanding democracy: the people had spoken in the election and 
every vote counted the same. The PS led the mobilisation and was seconded by the PPD, the 
CDS and the smaller right-wing parties. At the same time, groups of extreme-right activists, 
former policemen, side by side with militant anti-communists with some democratic credentials, 
began to engage in political violence and stir anti-communist riots42.  
Anger was palpable in the whole North of the country. 'The immensely heartening thing about 
what is going on in Portugal now’ the conservative journalist Robert Moss reported from Braga, 
‘is that so many ordinary people seem prepared to fight, if necessary, to prevent their country 
being turned into the Cuba of Western Europe´43. Political demonstrations and rallies were held 
all over Portugal. Attendants displayed their support for the Catholic hierarchy, their dislike of 
the bearded revolutionary military and their opposition to communism. The PS and the PPD 
organised demonstrations in all of the district capitals and in scores of smaller towns in the 
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northern half of the country, while bishops called for rallies in Aveiro, Braga, Bragança, Coimbra, 
Guarda, Leiria, Vila Real and Viseu. In addition, landowners organised in opposition to land 
reform and showed their capacity to rally great numbers. They were specially militant and 
successful in the central districts of the country, Leiria, Santarém and Castelo Branco, where the 
proprietors of middle sized plots observed in fear the advances of land reform in the 
neighbouring area of large landed estates.  
Mass rallies had a powerful impact on the strategic interaction. First, massive attendance to the 
demonstrations was used as testimony to the falsehood of the radical’s interpretation of 
electoral results. PS voters displayed their support to their leaders, often using their Trade Union 
flags to emphasize the workers’ commitment to democratic liberties. Second, demonstrations 
helped to make visible the meaning of otherwise cold electoral figures - countering the bias of 
Lisbon´s media, mostly controlled by the radicals’ allies. Furthermore, the combination of 
electoral figures with demonstrations broke the spiral of silence that had favoured the 
hegemony of radical positions in the public arena. Finally, the demonstrations forced political 
actors to take into account the local electoral results, which dictated the replacement of radical 
local authorities by officials closer to local preferences.  
The Catholic Church, that had remained mostly silent about the virtues of democracy during the 
dictatorship, now mobilised in its defence and offered logistic support. The church-led rallies 
and demonstrations were attended by both men and women. Anti-communist prayers were 
frequent in mass, and some nocturnal processions against communism were organised, but in 
the main demonstrations called by the church participants mostly abstained from using religious 
images, such as virgins and saints, and instead, carried banners, sang secular songs and chanted 
slogans supporting freedom of expression and democracy. In Braga, the participants chanted 
‘the christian people are not reactionary’. In Viseu, the multitude sang Canta amigo canta –a 
protest song from the 1960s that said ´alone you are nothing, together we have the world in our 
hands’– and chanted ‘Bishop, friend, the people are with you’, ´Radio Renascença is ours´ and 
‘the popular will has to be respected’44.  
Anti-communist violence erupted in at leat 45 municipalities and more than 80 communist party 
and trade unions offices were damaged. Most of the rioting took place in the northern half of 
the country, in the aftermath of anti-communist demonstrations that started peacefully. In 
Aveiro, for example, the Church called for a silent march, but militant groups handed out 
propaganda leaflets calling for violence, sounded the tocsin, removed communist posters from 
the streets and stirred the crowd into taking action. Most of the violence followed the same 
script. While chanting ‘we are the people’ and denouncing the communists and Moscow, some 
demonstrators converged on and surrounded local PCP offices, while those who were quicker 
to action began throwing stones and assaulting the buildings. Militant anticommunists who 
fostered the attacks were shocked by the eager participation of a mass of anonymous citizens45. 
Sttau Monteiro, a Lisbon journalist, was surprised to discover that most of the rioters were not 
supporting a return to ‘fascism’; instead, they used slogans linked to the carnation revolution, 
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such as ’the people rules’ and ‘yes to democracy, no to dictatorship’46. In each region the anti-
communists draw on local democratic traditions. In Viana do Castelo, for example, 
aniticommunist leaflets appealed to the memory of Norton de Matos, the anti-salazarist leader 
of the 1940s47. Cries of ‘Down with the communists’, ‘burn them', and insults like ‘thieves’, 
‘assassins’ and ´liars´ were heard as well48.  
On several occasions, anti-communist crowds were on the streets for two and even three full 
days. In these cases, the people organised pickets and went to attack the offices of other left-
wing parties, trade unions, and politically-committed lawyers and doctors. When identified as 
belonging to communist militants or sympathisers, cars were burned and the windows of cafés 
and businesses were stoned. Some groups simply wandered in excitement around town – 
shouting, exchanging news and running to wherever something seemed to be going on. In 
Famalicão, two communists were forced to flee their home when it was invaded by an angry 
crowd. During the night, vans carrying left-leaning newspapers from Lisbon – which condemned 
the anti-communist demonstrations and violence as ‘reactionary’ and ‘fascist’– were stopped 
and its contents burned49. ‘Violence?’ asked the church-owned regional press ‘to speak in the 
name of the people without representing the popular will, this is violence as well’50.  
This mobilization caused the MFA to splinter. During the first days of the anti-communist 
campaign, the PCP sought to frame that mobilisation as a reactionary and fascist operation 
against the Revolution. The attacks against PCP headquarters were easily presented as fascist 
terrorism, but when the PS called for mass demonstrations in Porto on 18 July and Lisbon the 
following day, the PCP stretched its reality-defining capabilities to the limit by announcing that 
those meetings were part of a new reactionary coup. The PCP and the MDP called on their 
partisans to barricade Lisbon, mirroring the strategy against Spínola and the ‘silent majority’ ten 
months before51. But now, after the election results and in the face of the anti-communist´s 
show of force, only hard-core militants answered the call. The roadblocks in the provinces were 
poorly manned and ‘powerless’, so most of the traffic could cut through the pickets52. Moreover, 
the labelling of Mário Soares and the PS as fascist reactionaries struck a dissonant chord with 
large sectors of the MFA. The head of military operations, Otelo de Carvalho, ordered the army 
to disband the roadblocks around Lisbon, so demonstrators could arrive unmolested53. In Porto, 
the multitude gathered in the football stadium, while in Lisbon it packed Alameda, a huge open 
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square. The Church also called on its faithful to attend the socialist’s demonstrations and the 
turnout was impressive. The PS claimed that it was ´the biggest political demonstration ever´54.  
The setback forced the PCP to change tactics. The PS had won the day and the socialists’ mass 
defiance had forced the military to take sides, creating a split in the MFA and greatly diminishing 
the communists’ ability to make the most of the situation. From then on, the communists would 
try to restore the unity of the MFA, but their main allies, Vasco Gonçalves’ radical military, were 
immersed in the military internecine struggle and trying to maintain the pace of revolutionary 
radicalisation55. A propaganda campaign was launched, aimed at reinforcing Vasco Gonçalves 
revolutionary leadership. It included a song that said ‘comrade Vasco, we will be your rampart 
of steel’ and scores of plebiscitary demonstrations, widely attended in the industrial areas and 
the south.  
Regarding the anti-communist riots in the north, MFA’s military intelligence called on the army 
‘to repress the actions against democratic order and cut the head of counterrevolution’56. The 
violence against the PCP showed that Lisbon had lost control of parts of the country. The radical 
cabinet faced a serious challenge: in order to govern, it needed to mobilise the coercive 
resources of the State. Developments in Vila Real district show that the combination between a 
committed local garrison and an equally committed police could make a control system work 
and prevent violence, despite the massive anti-communist leanings of the population. The local 
PPD lamented ‘the excessive presence of armed soldiers, making it seem like the people were 
an enemy that needed to be watched’ but, in Vila Real, three large-scale anti-communist 
demonstrations took place that summer without major outbursts of violence57. 
Vila Real, however, was the exception. In most of the northern provinces the military officers 
were not politically committed and the police was still demoralised, waiting for reorganisation. 
At the beginning of August, passivity in the face of ‘reactionary’ activities led to the dismissal of 
the police commanders of Aveiro, Coimbra, Chaves and Santarém58. After the first violent 
assaults on the PCP, the military commander of the Northern Military Region, brigadier 
Corvacho, had asked his men for a more committed defence of public order, but once deployed 
in the streets most of the units would not fire, which made their deterrence efforts flounder. 
The different garrisons scattered all over the country, some of which had hitherto only watched 
the Revolution from afar, were now forced to take part in it. Most of them, by their passive non-
commitment, disobeyed orders and sided against the radicals. As the military intelligence 
complained, the units sent to protect the PCP offices ‘were inactive and sometimes even 
collaborated with the ransackings’59.  
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As the local military refused to intervene, the naval infantry was sent to the north. They were 
deployed in Braga, but when their ‘warning shots’, supposedly fired into the air, killed two anti-
communist demonstrators, a new uproar broke out. Would the liberating military become 
repressors? Would they be ‘a colonising force’, as the CDS labelled the naval infantry?60 
One of the victim’s funerals took place in Famalicão, near Porto, and according to the police, 
’the entire population attended’. After the burial, ‘the PCP's office was assaulted and sacked and 
the cars of two communist militants were burned down’61. Two streets were named after the 
victims, while in the recently inaugurated constituent assembly one PPD member of parliament 
demanded that ‘Portugal should never again hear the lugubrious sound of automatic rifles fired 
against the people’62. The ready-made discursive framework that linked repression and fascism, 
one that had been consistently used against the dictatorship by the democratic opposition, 
could now be directed against Vasco Gonçalves’ government and the radical MFA63. 
The disunity in the MFA ranks became public on 6 August 1975, when nine councillors of the 
revolution, out of a total of twenty, issued a manifesto rejecting ‘Eastern European style 
socialism’. This Melo Antunes document, as it became known, supported a socialist economy, 
but rejected ‘Leninist vanguards’ and fully endorsed pluralist democracy. The signing of the 
manifesto was made public, thus sealing the signatories’ strong commitment, while copies were 
sent to military units for the officers to sign. President Costa Gomes suspended the original 
subscribers from the Council of the Revolution, but they had already launched an open revolt 
within the MFA64.  
The political struggle, meanwhile, had become a competition for the ability to mobilize 
supporters and fill streets, squares and sporting pavilions with crowds showing unity and 
commitment. In the Northern town of Viseu, ‘30.000 demonstrators congratulated Infantry 8 
for having signed the Melo Antunes document’65. Violent crowds took the town the following 
day and destroyed the offices of nine left-wing parties, associations and trade unions, while the 
police and the military were mere passive spectators of the riots66. ‘The true people-Armed 
Forces alliance is being forged between the popular masses of the North and the soldiers that 
reject repressing the people’, the socialist Pedro Coelho claimed in a rally held in Évora. Pezarat 
Correia, head of the Southern Military Region, had also signed the document and some 
thousands of demonstrators answered the PS call to convene and hail him. On the other hand, 
Évora being a communist stronghold, the military had to protect the demonstrators in the face 
of a more numerous crowd that shouted against fascism and reactionary forces67. 
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While in April 1974 the demonstrators that marched to the barracks all over the country wanted 
to congratulate the military, from August to November 1975 the parties that mobilised their 
supporters in front of the local garrison were courting them, asking them to take sides. 'Parties 
without a popular mandate and unable to win the vote want you to become an army of 
occupation ' said a manifesto read in Castelo Branco: 'the people believe that […] the military 
forces and the police will accept democratic authority and that they will take a stand against the 
establishment of any kind of dictatorship '68. All over the country the local garrison became the 
object of a sustained courtship campaign. Region by region, barrack by barrack, demonstrators 
called on the military for political definition, thus rendering visible the territorial expression of 
political polarisation. 
In southern Portugal, where the left was strongest, the demonstrators paraded in front of the 
barracks hailing land reform and the People-MFA alliance. In some places the same unit had 
different political suitors. In Santarém district, where the Tagus River separates the social and 
political north from the social and political South, tensions were running particularly high. The 
locally-based Armored Cavalry (EPC) had been the one to take Lisbon during the carnation 
revolution and had a great symbolic weight. On 8 August a demonstration paraded in front of 
the garrison greeting the land reform and the ‘people–MFA alliance’. Although the 
demonstrators were saluted by some officers, the unit would later vote to adhere to the Melo 
Antunes manifesto and became one of the key forces in the moderate military camp69.  
 
As more units sided with the Melo Antunes document, the PCP was left unguarded. The 
mobilisation escalated on 16 August, when a PCP public meeting in Alcobaça (Leiria), where 
Álvaro Cunhal was going to make an appearance, was also attacked by a large crowd. The small 
town was filled by anti-communist demonstrators and the violent clashes forced the meeting to 
come to an end. Another communist rally scheduled in Porto for the following week was 
cancelled due to the threat of violence70. The commander of the Central Military Region, Charais, 
had signed the Melo Antunes Document and had publicly renounced to make his units fire at 
anti-communist rioters. In Porto, the commander of the Northern Military Region, Corvacho, 
was a committed radical, but he could not make his men obey. Trying to manage the now 
widespread indiscipline, the MFA moderates raised the tone of their defiance and organised the 
withdrawal of most of the units of the Northern Military Region from the radical chain of 
command: for as long as a radical remained in charge, they would rather deal with the Central 
Military Region71. Dislodging Corvacho became the goal for the anti-communist coalition in the 
North. Thousands of demonstrators marched in the streets of Porto, Braga and Viana do Castelo 
claiming against the radical brigadier. A numbers competition ensued, with the radical left also 
organising demonstrations of support. ‘The small attendance to the demonstrations in favour of 
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Corvacho shows that he had lost the support of the people’, the CDS proclaimed72. The popular 
mobilisation and the signposting of the military allegiances territorialized the confrontation. In 
Lisbon and its industrial belt, as in the southern large landed estates provinces, the radicals 
dominated the streets and found support among the military stationed in local barracks. In the 
rest of the country, the anti-communist coalition was clearly stronger. 
 
While the mass demonstrations could claim to embody the popular will, violence also played a 
peculiar role in the political process. The passive response to the sacking of PCP offices, in itself 
a public refusal to obey orders, made clear that the MFA moderates could now count on the 
mass of hitherto politically undefined officers to counter the radicals. In addition, a share of the 
MFA officers who until then had sided with the radicals became aware that the permanence of 
Vasco Gonçalves in office would mean a steadfast repressive policy. Events had shifted the 
meanings of the political moment: as this was not the peaceful transition to socialism that many 
MFA men had envisaged, many withdrew their support to the radicals. The following, distinctly 
bitter, MFA Assembly took place in September. While the officers were discussing the political 
situation, big demonstrations were booing Corvacho in Porto and Viana do Castelo and cheering 
Charais in Aveiro and Coimbra73. The Assembly dismissed Vasco Gonçalves and Corvacho, and 
reshuffled the Council of the Revolution in favour of the moderates. A new cabinet was created, 
tailored to the moderates’ will. It was headed by Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, the PS and the 
PPD once again entered government and, in a delicate balancing act, the PCP accepted one 
seat74. 
As the sixth provisional government came into power, there was an abrupt halt in anti-
communist popular violence. Social turmoil persisted nonetheless. In the north, the new military 
commander dismantled the radical units – not without popular resistance – and empowered the 
police. In Lisbon –where the popular power proponent Otelo de Carvalho was the military 
commander– and the south, in contrast, radicalised troops fraternised with the trade unions and 
other popular organisations, thus weakening government control75. As the occupation of large 
estates by landless peasants peaked, left-wing soldiers who disagreed with the moderate turn 
radicalized their indiscipline and newly-formed committees began to coordinate popular 
organisations towards the formation of a radical front76. 
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A new mobilisation campaign tried to revive the radical’s momentum and renew the alliance 
between the ‘people’ and the armed forces. In Évora, Setúbal, Lisbon, in the naval base of 
Almada and in the Montijo airfield, large crowds assembled to demonstrate that ‘the workers’ 
supported the revolution77. In response, the supporters of the new government once again took 
to the streets. ‘The sixth provisional government represents the popular will’, read an article 
published the PS newspaper, full of pictures of demonstrators; 'The people of Coimbra showed 
its enthusiastic support for the government and to brigadier Charais', claimed the local press; 
'Discipline! Discipline! Discipline!' chanted the crowds in Porto and Faro78. The PPD and the PS 
organised a new round of demonstrations in most district capitals. 'Military men', hailed a 
manifesto handed to Aveiro´s Infantry Regiment, 'our presence here is the natural manifestation 
of our support to the true military, those that will not forget that they belong to the people and 
that they shall defend that same people'79. A similar wording had the opposite political meaning 
in the oath taken by the new recruits of Lisbon's artillery regiment, the radical RALIS. There the 
soldiers, as they gave the clenched-fist salute, promised ‘to be always on the side of the 
people'80.  
The spectre of civil war was looming. Already in May, when it became apparent that the 
communists were training some militias ‘for the defence of the revolution’, the PS had made 
clear that they would not remain passive: ‘we outnumber the communists […] if the organisation 
of militias is accepted, we will have our own81. In September, PPD’s frontman Emídio Guerreiro 
had announced that they could easily count on 50,000 armed men, while Freitas do Amaral, the 
CDS leader, warned the people attending his meetings that they should 'remain vigilant in case 
we have to defend on the streets what they want to take away from us on the streets’. Several 
local catholic journals reprinted an ‘assessment of the prospect of armed struggle’: ‘in the North, 
combative, patriotic, religious and anti-imperialist populations are close to its military men (…) 
In the South, rootless proletarians, obedient to Moscow and loosely linked to the anarchistic 
military. (…) May God help the best, may God help us’82. Isolated from their context, these words 
could just be taken as empty angry menaces, but the consistent anti-communist mobilisation 
for five long months made the civil war scenario a realistic possibility. 
In November, Portugal was again the theatre of daily demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations, some defending popular power and revolution and others supporting the 
government. Amidst rumours of a radical coup d’état, military intelligence collected reports on 
the different demonstrations, trying to measure the support for each of the players. In one week 
they registered 15 demonstrations and, according to them, almost 50.000 demonstrated in 
Porto against ‘the rightist turn of the revolution’, while the same number had shown their 
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support for the government in Lisbon83. On 13 November a well-attended construction workers’ 
demonstration arrived at the constituent assembly. They asked for government-backed higher 
wages, but the demonstration became a revolutionary statement when the multitude besieged 
the building, not letting the MPs either enter or exit. Lisbon’s military units and the police 
refused to intervene. The workers held the assembly hostage for more than 30 hours, until the 
government fully accepted their demands. Finally on 20 November the cabinet announced that 
it had no conditions to govern and they went ‘on strike’, moving to Porto ‘until the Armed Forces 
re-established the conditions for effective government’. 
The moderate faction of the MFA prepared to outwit the radicals. On 25 November 1975 a move 
by the parachutists against their chain of command was over-interpreted as a would-be far-left 
coup d’état; the pro-government military took advantage and mobilized the Commandos 
regiment to take control of Lisbon. Some radical military asked for a bold response, confident in 
the strength of the naval infantry, while trade unionists gathered in front of friendly military 
units and asked for weapons. However, in the northern districts the anti-communist crowds 
were also in the streets, barricading the roads, and they had more than proved their 
determination to fight. The radicals were once again faced with a choice: would they take control 
of Lisbon, at the risk of provoking a civil war? After some hesitations they conceded defeat: the 
naval infantry was not mobilised and the moderates won the day. Colonel Ramalho Eanes 
appeared now as the strong man of the moderate faction of the MFA and he led the political 
exploitation of this victory. He purged radical and populist officers and disbanded the 
undisciplined units. Traditional hierarchy was re-established within the armed forces and the 
police was revamped, putting an end to the crisis of authority. The revolution was over. Electoral 
democracy could proceed84. 
 
The MFA Assembly of September 1975 that dismissed Vasco Gonçalves, first, and then the 
military showdown of 25 November 1975, changed the track of the revolution and enhanced 
the prospects of electoral democracy. Both of these events would not have been possible 
without the anti-communist mobilisation of the previous months. The decision to attend those 
demonstrations made by thousands of citizens undermined the interpretation of the electoral 
results put forward by the radical military, enabled the shifting of loyalties within the MFA and 
activated of hitherto passive sectors of the armed forces. If public meetings, rallies, and marches 
had been a significant thermometer of public preferences before the April 1975 vote, after the 
polls civil resistance became crucial for the translation of the electoral results into political 
power. 
Leading accounts of the impact of social movements argue that democratisation requires the 
demobilisation of civil society. In the 1990s this view was challenged by authors that emphasised 
the positive role of the so-called ‘mass publics’, ‘non-elites’, ‘social movements’ and ‘collective 
actors’. Bermeo proposed that the elites need to have a specific relationship with non-elites to 
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be able to bargain in their name and represent them85. Glenn added that, as popular will 
becomes the yardstick of legitimacy and the elites have to compete for the conditional support 
of the masses, the elites are constrained in their options86. Finally, while some accounts of social 
mobilisation presented it as external to the political process and amenable to political 
manipulation, Tarrow stressed that mass publics also have the ability to make strategic 
choices87. By analysing how the anti-communist mobilisation of the summer and fall of 1975 
affected the political process, this text has argued that far from endangering democratisation, 
militant mobilisation was crucial for imposing the value of free competitive elections over 
alternative sources of legitimacy, namely ‘revolution’.  
The Portuguese men and women who took to the streets, answering calls for rallies, 
demonstrations, the boycott of political acts or the popular control of roadways, were active 
participants in their political future. By attending, or by remaining at home, they turned those 
calls into relevant political facts, albeit open to the discursive elaboration of its meaning in the 
political arena. They were strategic actors. Formal and informal networks supported the 
mobilisations: Church, political parties, trade unions and associations played their part on the 
events, but it would be an error to ignore the active discussion, the face to face interactions and 
the decisions of the common people who turned up. As we have seen, the socialists were 
surprised by their ability to fill a pavilion in January 1975. Anti-communist militants were 
shocked by the combativeness of thousands of anonymous demonstrators during the hot 
summer. In addition, organisation and resources were not enough to mobilise a putative 
constituency. When progressive Catholics sided with the radicals, nobody attended their 
demonstrations88. Even the communists discovered at its peril that, in July 1975,  they were no 
longer able to mobilise the anti-fascist masses of September 1974.  
Civil resistance assured that the voting became meaningful. While the substantial attendance to 
demonstrations flagged a widespread backing of electoral democracy, popular violence against 
PCP also played a strategic role, reframing the political situation. First this violence forced the 
radical government to resort to coercion, debilitating its claim to popular support and thus 
shifting the preferences of many MFA officers. Then it compelled the non-committed military, 
scattered all over the country, to take sides, breaking the radical's chain of command, thus 
reinforcing the moderates’ position. Finally, popular violence played an important symbolic role, 
signalling a commitment to conflict escalation. Violence made credible the often announced 
threat to go for a civil war in case electoral results were disregarded. In short, mass mobilisation 
and political violence backing clear electoral results isolated the most radical MFA officers and 
forced the majority of the military to accept electoral democracy, a scenario they preferred over 
civil war. In 1974, the carnation revolution was followed by a first wave of social mobilisation, 
which put social issues into the political agenda and empowered a radical coalition. In the 
summer of 1975, a new wave of political protest dislodged the radicals. Only a small minority of 
the demonstrators had fought against dictatorship before the revolution, but the revolution had 
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made democracy possible and, when they saw it in danger, they took to the streets chanting ‘o 
povo é que mais ordena’ [The people rules]. 
 
 
